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The concurrence of technical and behavioral trends – such as lightweight approaches for service 
composition and a rising demand for customized services – fosters the emergence of a novel 
organizational paradigm: Service Value Networks (SVN). Distributed and highly-specialized 
service providers contribute to an overall value proposition. SVNs provide means for the ad-hoc 
composition of services that satisfies individual customers' needs. However, the distributed nature 
of these environments and the opportunistic behavior of participants require a purposeful design 
of incentives. Our contribution is threefold: We (i) provide an auction mechanism – the Complex 
Service Auction – to coordination value creation in SVNs which is incentive compatible in 
dominant strategies (truthful). To restore budget balance – the prerequisite for a mechanism's 
sustainability – and to implement incentives that increase a network's degree of interoperability, 
we (ii) present the Interoperability Transfer Function (ITF). Applying an agent-based simulation 
method, we (iii) numerically show that this payment scheme limits strategic behavior of service 
providers and strengthens interoperability endeavors compared to a benchmark transfer function. 
Keywords:  Mechanism Design, Auction, Service Engineering, Service Science 
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Introduction 
Since the end of the 1990s, the software industry has undergone tremendous changes. Driven by maturing Web 
services technologies and the wide acceptance of the service-oriented architecture paradigm, the software industry's 
traditional business models along with business strategies have already heavily started to erode – with far-reaching 
consequences: Software vendors turn into service providers. While traditional software products are installed on 
customer site, including prepaid perpetual-use licenses, so-called software-as-a-service (SaaS) or on-demand 
software is hosted and maintained by the service provider and offers usage- or subscription-based pricing models. 
While the success story of on-demand software is already sealed, a second wave of innovation has great potentials to 
shake the software industry's foundations once again. Exploiting the capabilities of Internet standards and 
interoperability, joint value creation of service providers has emerged. Open standards and service-oriented 
architectures constitute important building blocks for innovative Web service networks, tying together the 
competencies of specialized contributors while customer value is created via the interplay of complementary service 
providers. 
The adaptiveness of the partners fits to the development of software customers' demanding more sophisticated as 
well as more specialized solutions and, at the same time, more flexible service provisioning (Bovet and Martha 
2000). One of the most powerful approaches to handle complexity is modularity that is composing the whole from 
smaller subsystems that are designed independently, yet function together as a whole (Baldwin and Clark 2000). 
Along those lines, vendors concentrate on their core activity while leveraging knowledge and assets of 
complementary partners. That way, they are able to stay agile and to flexibly adapt their services to changes in the 
environment, be it customer-, competition-, or regulation-driven. Such joint value creation in terms of Web services 
is mostly coordinated by a mediating entity as conceivable in today's leading service platforms: Salesforce.com 
offers its on-demand service market place AppExchange and its development platform force.com, Xignite operates 
the Splice Mashup Platform, and StrikeIron has ready the IronCloud Web services delivery platform, just to name a 
few. 
However, besides above-mentioned increase in customers' demands and the resultant agility of service providers, 
other concrete economic factors drive this second innovation wave of the software industry: Requirements for 
functional and non-functional characteristics of electronic services are much more pronounced and specific than in 
other domains. If a service customer can choose between a Web service that perfectly fits her needs and a Web 
service that is programmed to capture the mass appeal, she will most probably purchase the former – if priced 
appropriately. What is more, modular services can be combined and configured into what is known as service 
mashups which have the potential to meet virtually every conceivable customer requirement, giving rise to a new 
level of customization. Such complex services involve the assembly and invocation of several specialized service 
modules offered by a multitude of specialized partners in order to complete a multi-step business functionality 
(Papazoglou 2007). Re-combining the service modules, new functionality is created “off-the-shelf” which is 
potentially able to meet a multitude of customer demands. 
From a technical perspective, dynamic Web services are increasingly used in the context of service mashups, 
facilitating lightweight approaches such as RESTful architectures and slim messaging formats such as JSON 
(Crockford 2006; Fielding 2000). The service mashup platform ProgrammableWeb reported that by middle of 2009, 
66% of all listed APIs expose REST interfaces, foretelling the trend to an internet of interoperable Web services. 
Economically, value is created through the interplay of various distributed service providers in ecosystem-like 
environments that jointly contribute to an individual, integrated solution. However, such environments will also 
include substitutive services and vendors. Thus, service providers find themselves in the fruitful state of co-
opetition, breeding both complementary opportunities and competitive threads (Brandenburger and Nalebuff 1996). 
While cooperation enables advanced value creation and the access to partners' assets and knowledge, the 
competitive component diminishes adverse effects of market power and spurs improvements and innovation 
(Bengtsson and Kock 2000). 
The above-introduced second innovation wave of the software industry, most notably the combinatorics in service 
mashups, can be optimally catalyzed by ubiquitously accessible service orchestration platforms – the service value 
networks (SVNs) – which are the underlying organizational form to this article (Blau et al. 2009). 
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Definition 1 (Service Value Networks). Service Value Networks are Smart Business Networks, which provide 
business value by automated on-demand composition of complex services from a steady, but open pool of 
complementary as well as substitutive standardized service modules through an ubiquitously accessible network 
orchestration platform. 
Economic considerations in SVNs are in their infancy. A multitude of challenges need to be tackled when 
coordinating services in SVNs. Embedded in the contradictory context of efficient outcomes and efficient 
computation, a suitable or desired solution to the allocation problem of service consumers' preferences and offered 
services needs to be found. Mechanism design has proven to be a powerful instrument to solve problems involving 
self-interested individuals with private information (Mas-Colell et al. 1995; Parkes 2001). Well-known from 
impossibility results in mechanism design, a suitable trade-off between different mechanism properties such as 
efficiency and budget-balance – or sustainability in a broader sense – needs to be identified and implemented by the 
design of incentives in SVNs.  
In this article, we provide an auction mechanism – the Complex Service Auction – to coordination value creation in 
SVNs which is incentive compatible in dominant strategies (truthful). To restore budget balance and to implement 
incentives that increase a network’s degree of interoperability, we present the Interoperability Transfer Function 
(ITF). Applying an agent-based simulation method, we numerically show that this payment scheme limits strategic 
behavior of service providers and strengthens interoperability endeavors compared to a benchmark transfer function.  
The remainder of this article is structured as follows: In Section 2, the design goals of a suitable mechanism for the 
coordination in SVNs are described and related research in this context is discussed. The section furthermore 
presents the SVN model and the mechanism implementation comprehending the bidding language, the allocation 
function, and the transfer function. In Section 3, the Interoperability Transfer Function (ITF) is presented that 
restores budget balance, implements incentives for service providers to increase their services’ degree of 
interoperability, and limits strategic behavior. The section outlines related approaches and discusses their 
shortcomings. Addressing the limitation of strategic behavior, Section 4 analyzes the strategic behavior of service 
providers under the presence of the presented mechanism implementation by means of an agent-based simulation. 
Finally, Section 5 summarizes the contribution and points out future research. 
The Model 
Our approach to design an auction mechanism to coordinate the composition of complex services – the Complex 
Service Auction (CSA) – is based on the discipline of mechanism design. Mechanism design is a subfield of game 
theory that pursues the idea of designing institutions that determine decisions as a function of the information that is 
known by the individuals in the economy in order to achieve a desired outcome (Myerson 1988). Mechanisms serve 
as a unifying conceptual structure, which allows for analyzing and comparing economic institutions with respect to 
their properties and suitability in order to foster certain outcomes.  
Design Goals 
The objective of mechanism design is to implement a social choice function in equilibrium strategies that yields 
desired properties. Such properties are often referred to as mechanism properties. Nevertheless, mechanisms do not 
directly expose these properties but they implement social choice functions that do so. The properties of a social 
choice are also referred to as mechanism properties. For an extended introduction to mechanism and social choice 
properties, the interested reader is referred to Parkes (2001). 
Design Goal 1 (Allocative Efficiency). A mechanism is allocatively efficient if its social choice function always 
determines an outcome such that there is no other outcome which yields a higher valuation for all agents, i.e. an 
allocative efficient mechanism maximizes the sum of all agents' utilities. 
Put differently, a mechanism is allocatively efficient if it maximizes the total value over all agents. The total value 
matches the welfare of the system. Such allocative efficiency is not always desirable, e.g. if the objective is revenue 
maximization of the auctioneer. In this case, the mechanism design problem is re-formulated as optimization 
problem (Parkes 2001) which maximizes the utility of a particular agent (Dash et al. 2003). However, optimal 
auction design will not be discussed in depth in this article – the interested reader is referred to Myerson (1981). 
IT Services 
4 Thirty First International Conference on Information Systems, St. Louis 2010  
Design Goal 2 (Budget Balance & Sustainability). A mechanism is said to be budget-balanced if no outside 
payments are required to realize the outcome rule. In addition, the net transfers between the agents for all types 
need to be zero. In other words, the system is financially autarkic and sustainable. 
So, budget balance denotes the situation where the amount of money remains unchanged after the outcome has been 
determined. However, the money is being re-distributed. 
Design Goal 3 (Individual Rationality). A mechanism is individually rational if it makes sure that agents are not 
worse-off by participating than by waiving participation. 
In other words, the agents do not suffer any loss by participating. Therefore, this property is also called voluntary 
participation. For simplification, the utility of the outside option is oftentimes assumed to be zero. This is a desirable 
property since more participating agents lead to a greater variety of paths as to SVNs which can be a prerequisite for 
allocative efficiency. 
As mentioned before, a central element of mechanism design is the question of how to incentivize agents to reveal 
their private preferences (i.e. types) truthfully. In order to prevent agents from “cheating”, that is, agents find it 
advantageous to conceal their true type, a mechanism needs to be compatible to the incentives of the agents 
(Hurwicz 1972a). Such incentive compatibility is said to be the key to overcome selfish behavior. Rational agents 
will only choose the strategy of reporting their type truthfully to the mechanism if and only if their own profit is 
maximized in doing so. Furthermore, if truth revelation is an equilibrium in dominant strategies, agents want to 
reveal their true type no matter which strategies are played by other participants. A mechanism that implements a 
social choice which yields such an equilibrium implements truthfulness. 
Design Goal 4 (Truthfulness). A mechanism is said to implement truthfulness if it is a direct revelation mechanism 
in which truth-telling is a dominant strategy for all agents. 
Truthfulness is also a desirable property of a mechanism as to its complexity. Agents do not have to reason about 
other agents' strategies since every agent decides to reveal its true type out of its own self-interest (Parkes 2001). 
Therefore, the agents' strategy spaces are considerably simplified. Based on the impossibility results that are well-
known in mechanism design theory (Green and Laffont 1987; Hurwicz and Walker 1990; Myerson and 
Satterthwaite 1983; Walker 1980), there is an inherent trade-off between design goals that has to be considered 
when constructing the mechanism's components. Hence, there are strong limitations regarding the design goals that 
can be simultaneously pursued. Despite of “traditional” mechanism design desiderata, design goals from a network 
perspective embody a crucial factor for the success of SVNs. 
The formation of networks drawing on a multitude of approaches has been extensively discussed in economic 
theory. A standard objective pursued is stability which can be formalized and analytically verified. Depending on 
the links type and formation assumption, pairwise stability can be a desirable target. In respect to networks with 
directed relationships, individual stability is a more substantial than considering both linked agents in order to make 
statements on its stability. 
When considering network formation, closely connected to stability is network efficiency. In networks with 
transferable units, it equals pareto efficiency. Therefore, network efficiency denotes the maximal total value of a 
network in terms of value distributed to the agents (Dutta and Mutuswami 1997; Jackson and Wolinsky 1996). 
However, as Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) found, such efficiency and pairwise stability are conflicting under quite 
weak assumptions. In respect to one-sided link formation and individual stability, Dutta and Mutuswami (1997) 
showed that incompatibility with network efficiency still holds unless some (quite useful) requirements are waived. 
In line with such trade-offs to be made when designing a certain manifestation of a network, other target settings in 
respect to link formation come into consideration. If links are interpreted as interoperability, or compatibility 
relationships, respectively, such as in the SVN environment, an as high as possible number of connections in the 
network can be a desirable goal. Links in SVNs denote the linkage of complementary services, therefore it is 
compatibility that actually enables complementarity (Economides 1996). In this connection, aiming at a fully 
intermeshed network that features all feasible links can be a design goal. If a complete network is unrealistic, a 
target setting that formulates the number of compatibility relationships in relative terms is an alternative to above-
mentioned measures. Such a relatively verbalized objective requires a comparison to suitable benchmarks. 
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Design Goal 5 (Interoperability). Assuming links in SVNs are interpreted as interoperability, or compatibility 
relationships, respectively, an as high as possible number of connections in the network is desirable. 
Service Value Network 
This section provides a SVN model that captures its main aspects in a comprehensive technical manner and lays the 
foundation for the design of the auction mechanism. 
A SVN is described by means of a simplified statechart model (Harel and Naamad 1996, cp. Figure 1) and is aligned 
with the representation in Zeng et al. (2003). Statecharts have proven to be the preferred choice for specifying 
process models as they expose well-defined semantics and they provide flow constructs offered by prominent 




Figure 1. Statechart Model 
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graph represents a candidate pool that entails service offers that provide the same (business) functionality. The set of 
N  nodes 
1
{ , , }
N
V v v= …  represents the set of service offers with , , ,u v i j  being arbitrary service offers. There are 
two designated nodes 
s
v  and 
f
v  that stand for source and sink in the network and are not part of any partition 
1
( , , )
K




V Y Y v v= ∪…∪ ∪ . Services are offered by a set of Q  service providers 
1
{ , , }
Q
S s s= …  with s  being an arbitrary service provider. The ownership information : ( { , })
s f
S V v vσ → P ‚   
that reveals which service provider owns which services within the network is public knowledge. The reverse 
ownership information 
1
: { , }
s f
V v v Sσ − →‚  maps service offers to single service providers that own that 
particular service. The set of edges { | , }
ij
E e i j V= ∈  denotes technically feasible service composition such that 
ij
e  
represents an interoperable connection of service i V∈  with service j V∈ . If two services are not interoperable at 
all, they are not connected within the network.  
Definition 2 (Service Configuration). A service configuration 
j
A  of a service j V∈   selects a value lja   for each 
attribute type l∈L  of a service and thereby unambiguously defines all relevant service characteristics. The choice 
of configuration might affect the functional and non-functional aspects of a service and is a major determinant of 
the price.  
A service configuration 
j
A  of service offer j V∈  is fully characterized by a vector of attributes 
1
( , , )
L
j j j
A a a= … where l
j
a  is an attribute value of attribute type l∈L  of service offer j 's configuration. Attribute 
types can be either functional attribute types or non-functional attribute types (e.g. availability or privacy). A 
service's configuration represents the quality level provided and differentiates its offering from other services. 
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Furthermore let 
ij
c  denote the internal variable costs that the service provider that owns service j  has to bear for 
that service being interoperable with service i  and for the execution of service j  as a successor of service i . The 
representation of a detailed cost structure of service providers is intentionally omitted which serves a better 
understanding and does not restrict the generalization of the model. It is assumed that the representation of internal 
variable costs reflects the service providers' valuations for their service offers being executed in different 
composition-related contexts. The instantiation of a complex service is represented by a path from source to sink 
within the SVN. Let F  denote the set of all feasible paths from source to sink. Every f F∈  with f E⊂  represents 
a possible instantiation of the complex service. Focusing on the presence or absence of a particular service ,
i
i V F−∈  
represents the set of all feasible paths from source to sink in the reduced graph 
i
G−  without node i  and without all 
its incoming and outgoing edges. In contrary, let 
i
F  be the subset of all feasible paths from source to sink that 
explicitly entail node i . 
Definition 3 (Service Value Network). A service value network model is an acyclic, k -partite and directed graph 
such that 
 ( , )G V E=  (1) 
with the set of nodes V  representing service offers and the set of edges E  that denotes technically feasible service 
compositions. G  contains two designated nodes 
s
v  and 
f
v  representing source and sink such that every feasible 
path f F∈  connecting both nodes is a possible instantiation of the complex service. 
For illustration purpose, Figure 2 shows the model of a SVN with service offers 
1 4
{ , , } { , }
s f
V v v v v= … ∪  and 
service providers 
1 3
{ , , }S s s= … . Every feasible path f F∈  connecting source node 
s
v  and sink node 
f
v  
represents a possible realization of the overall complex service. 
 
 
Figure 2. SVN Model 
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Bidding Language 
As a formalization of information objects which are exchanged during the auction conduction a bidding language is 
introduced that is based on bidding languages for products with multiple attributes as discussed in Engel et al. 
(2006). The formalization is aligned to multiattribute auction theory as presented in Parkes and Kalagnanam (2002); 
Ronen and Lehmann (2005) and assures compliance with the WS-Agreement specification (Andrieux et al 2004) in 
order to enable realization in decentralized environments such as the Web. 
A complex service – represented by a path f  – is characterized by a configuration
f
A . The importance of certain 
attributes and prices of a requested complex service is idiosyncratic and depends on the preferences of the requester. 
The requesters' preferences are represented by a scoring function ( )
f
S A . The scoring function represents the 
requesters' preferences for a configuration 
f
A  of the complex service represented by f  analog to the definition of 
scoring rules in Asker and Cantillon (2008). It maps the configuration of a complex service to a value representing 
the requester's score 
Having defined how the score for certain outcomes is computed based on the requester's preferences, a specification 





=∑T  represent the sum of all monetary transfers to service providers, i.e. the overall price of the complex 
service denoted by f . Hence, the requester's utility gained from purchasing a complex service specified by a path 
f  with a configuration 
f
A  evolves as follows: 
                                                            ( , , , ) ( )
R
f f f f f
α αΛ = −U A T S A T                                                       (2) 
The factor α  represents the requester's willingness to pay for a ''perfect'' configuration 
f
A  with score ( ) 1
f
=S A  
based on reported preferences. In other words α  defines the individual substitution rate between quality and price 
such that the requester is indifferent between an increase of 1  score unit and α  monetary units. Incorporating that 
information, a service request for a multidimensional complex service is defined as follows: 
Definition 4 (Multidimensional Service Request). A multidimensional service request for a complex service is a 
vector of the form: 
                                                                           : ( , , )R α= ΛY                                                                     (3) 
such that 
1
( , , )
K
Y Y= …Y   represents all candidate pools with the SVN, i.e. necessary information for each service 
provider about preceding service offers. The maximum willingness to pay for a configuration that yields a score of 
1  is denoted byα . The set of weights Λ  represents the requesters' preferences for different attribute types l∈L . 
Having specified the bidding language for requesters we define a notation for the provider side. A multidimensional 
service offer consists of an announced service configuration 
j
A  and a corresponding price 
ij
p  that a service 
provider wants to charge for the service j  being invoked depending on the predecessor service i . An offer bid 
( , )
ij j ij
b A p=  is a service offer for invocation of service j  as a successor of service i . A service provider s  
announces a matrix of bids sB ∈B  for all incoming edges to every service it owns: 
Definition 5 (Multidimensional Service Offer). A multidimensional service offer is a matrix of bids of the form: 
                                                    
( , ), ( ), ( )
:
( , ), otherwise
b A p i j j sij j ijs
B
Aj
τ σ= ∈ ∈
= 
−∞
                                                (4) 
with ( )vτ  denotes the set of all predecessor services to service v  with :V Vτ →  and ( )sσ  the set of all services 
owned by service provider s . 
j
A  is an arbitrary service configuration. 
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U  denote the overall utility of path f  based on the reported types. Let further 
f
P  be the sum of all price bids 





=∑P . The allocation function :o F→B  maps the 
service providers' bids B∈B  – their reported types – to a feasible path from source to sink *f F∈ such that: 
                                                   ( )( ) :  ( )f F f f F f fo B argmax argmax α∈ ∈= = −U S A P                                     (5) 
For the sake of simplicity, the expression “allocated service offer” means that this service offer has an incoming 
edge that is entailed in the allocated set of edges *f . Analogously, the expression ``allocated service provider'' 
means that a service provider owns at least one “allocated service offer” 
Having defined an allocation function to perform a desired social choice that selects a set of edges within G  that 
determine the instance of the complex service, a function that specifies monetary transfers to service providers has 
to be designed. 
Let *U  denote the overall utility of the allocated path meaning the utility of the path *f , which maximizes the 
overall utility. Furthermore, let *
s−U  denote the overall utility of a path 
*
s
f−  that yields the maximum welfare in a 
reduced graph 
s
G−  without every service owned by service provider s  and without incoming and outgoing edges of 
these service offers, i.e. the complex service instance that maximizes welfare in an SVN without service provider 
s 's participation. 
Definiton 6 (Critical Value). The critical value ,scritt∆  of a service provider s  represents its contribution to the 
system as the difference between the overall utility *U  in the complete graph and the overall utility in the reduced 
graph *
s−U  without service offers owned by service provider s  and incoming and outgoing edges of these services 
such that 
                                                                               ,s * *crit
s
t −∆ = −U U                                                            (6) 
Transfer 
Every service provider s  receives a monetary transfer st  for all services s  owns that are allocated by ( )o B . 
Analogue to the idea of a second-price auction, a monetary compensation 
| , ( ), ( )ij ij
s
ije e o j s i j
t p
σ τ∈ ∈ ∈
−∑  for service 
provider s  that owns service offers ( )j sσ∈  corresponds to the monetary equivalent of the utility gap between the 
allocated path and the allocated path in the reduced graph without s  and all its incoming and outgoing edges, i.e. the 
critical value of service provider s . In other words the additional payment 




ije e o j s i j
t p
σ τ∈ ∈ ∈
− ≥∑  is a 
monetary equivalent to the utility service provider s  contributes to the overall utility of the system. Thus, the 
transfer st  represents the price that service provider s  could have charged without losing its participation in the 
winning allocation. Consequently, the transfer function st  for service provider s  is defined as 
                                         
* *
ij( ) ( )
( ), if  e o
:
0, otherwise




 + − ∈
= 

∑ ∑ U U
                                                (7) 
Incentivizing Interoperability Endeavors and Achieving Budget Balance 
The mechanism implementation of the CSA consists of a transfer function that pays each service provider z  that 
owns allocated service offers the corresponding price bid and the critical value ,zcritt∆  in addition. The critical value 
represents a monetary equivalent to the provider's utility contribution to the whole system such 
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that ,z * *crit
z
t −∆ = −U U . Price bids of each service offer that is allocated by the mechanism plus the corresponding 
critical value have to be paid by the service requester to the service providers. A provider's critical value 
compensates the individual contribution to the system which depends on the contributions of the other participants. 
Hence, the payments, the service requester has to distribute among service providers depend on multiple factors (e.g. 
the network topology). In case the payments exceed the requester's willingness to pay in the CSA, budget balance 
cannot be achieved by the mechanism. 
 
 
Figure 3. Non-Budget-Balanced Outcome of the CSA 
 
Example 1 (Achieving Budget Balance). This example illustrates a non-budget-balanced outcome of the CSA. 
Figure 3 shows a SVN with service offers {1, 2,3, 4,5,6} { , }V s f= ∪ . For simplicity it is assumed that each service 
provider 
1 6
, ,s s…  only owns a single service within the network such that ( ) { }
i
s iσ =  with 1, ,6i = … . Furthermore 
it is assumed that the requester's willingness to pay is 12α = . 
The mechanism allocates the path 
*
1 14 4
{ , , }
s f
f e e e=  as it yields the highest overall utility of * 12 (2 2) 8f = − + =U . 
According to the transfer function, each service provider that owns allocated service offers receives a payment 
consisting of the corresponding price bid and the critical value such that 
1
2 (8 3) 7t = + − =  and 
4
2 (8 4) 6t = + − = . 
The sum of transfers which are distributed among the service providers exceeds the service requesters willingness to 
pay as 12 (7 6) 1R = − + = −U . Thus, an amount of 1  unit has to be externally subsidized in order to obtain the 
efficient allocation maximizing welfare. 
This section introduces an extension to the CSA that restores the desideratum of budget balance by sacrificing 
truthfulness to a certain degree. The extension is based on the design of a transfer function – the Interoperability 
Transfer Function (ITF) – that limits overpayments to satisfy budget balance constraints. The ITF implements 
incentives for increasing services' interoperability with adjacent offers to foster the growth of agile SVNs with an 
increased level of feasible complex service instantiations. 
Related Work 
In incentive compatible mechanisms, agents are incentivized to choose the strategy of revealing their true type. 
Incentive compatible mechanisms such as the celebrated Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism are firstly 
introduced and extensively investigated in Vickrey (1961); Clarke (1971); Groves (1973); Green and Laffont (1978). 
In VCG-based mechanisms, the transfers are indeterministic and can be arbitrarily high (Archer and Tardos 2007). 
These so called overpayments or a mechanism's frugality is a central characteristic of a mechanism implementation. 
This phenomenon is extensively analyzed in mechanism design research especially in the context of graph-based 
implementations (Archer and Tardos 2007; Elkind et al. 2004; Karlin and Kempe 2005; Talwar 2003). A frugality 
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ratio that measures the payments in a truthful mechanism compared to a non-truthful implementation is a ratio that 
``characterizes the cost of insisting on truthfulness'' (Karlin and Kempe 2005). Approaches to predict overpayments 
that occur in truthful graph-based mechanisms have been developed in Karger and Nikolova (2004) in the context of 
random graphs and in Karger and Nikolova (2005) for large-scale networks. 
Addressing this shortcoming of VCG-based mechanisms, an approximately efficient and budget-balanced solution 
to overpayment issues in VCG-based combinatorial auctions is introduced in Parkes et al. (2001) while focusing on 
solving linear problems subject to budget balance that yield approximate incentive compatible solutions. Another 
approach to counteract the loss of budget balance by sacrificing efficiency is introduced in Archer and Tardos 
(2007) in the context of path auctions. In their work they replace the efficient allocation function by a class of 
''minimum functions'' that yield lower overpayments in certain scenarios. Nevertheless they show that it is always 
possible to construct worse case scenarios in which minimum functions perform as bad as the efficient variant. 
The Interoperability Transfer 
As we have shown in Example 1, the transfer function as introduced in Equation (7) is not budget-balanced and can 
be subject to serious overpayments. However, it is oftentimes stated that budget-balance and individual rationality 
are compulsory characteristics of a mechanism to make it sustainable in practical application (Mas-Colell et al. 
1995; Parkes 2001). Individual rationality is vital since agents are not willing to voluntarily participate if they expect 
to incur losses. On the other hand, a mechanism cannot be continuously subsidized by its operator or some set of the 
agents in the long run. Taking the impossibility constraints by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) into account, 
allocative efficiency must be sacrificed to guarantee a mechanism's sustainability in the long run. 
Classic mechanism design, as Parkes (2001) calls it, seeks for efficient outcomes, therefore requiring that agents 
reveal their private information truthfully. If the welfare of the system shall be maximized, agents must reveal their 
true types. It is certainly possible to construct inefficient, but incentive-compatible mechanisms (Myerson 1982; 
Feigenbaum et al. 2001). On the other hand, mechanisms that are not incentive-compatible cannot be allocatively 
efficient per definition (Parkes et al. 2001). If utility maximization is conducted over types that are not necessarily 
truthful, statements on the “true” welfare cannot be made. 
However, non-incentive-compatible mechanism design can be reasonable – in this case truthful bidding is not an 
equilibrium strategy for agents (Parkes et al. 2001). In other words, incentive-compatibility is not a requirement, but 
rather a desideratum that can be approached as close as possible. Certainly, mechanism design in the narrow 
meaning does not require such a variation: technically, non-incentive-compatible mechanisms can be subsumed 
under the class of incentive-compatible ones. According to the revelation principle any social choice function 
achieved with a non-incentive-compatible mechanism can be transferred in an equivalent incentive-compatible 
direct-revelation mechanism (Myerson 1979; Gibbard 1973). However, computational assumptions of the revelation 
principle are unrealistic. First, it assumes that agents in the non-incentive-compatible mechanism are generally 
capable of computing their equilibrium strategies. Second, for the submission of agents' strategies and the 
computation of the outcome by the mechanism operator, the revelation principle postulates unlimited computational 
resources (Parkes 2001; Ledyard 1993). Yet, from an economic standpoint, in some cases, it might not be the 
ultimate goal to achieve a truthful revelation of the agents' types. This can be the case, for instance, if the 
mechanism's allocation function maximizes reported surplus instead of actual surplus resulting from truthful 
information revelation of the agents. Sacrificing truthfulness in favor of other properties can be reasonable in order 
to obtain a “good (enough)” result. 
Summarized, implied by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), if budget balance and individual rationality are to hold, 
one must sacrifice allocative efficiency no matter if incentive-compatibility is present or not. On the other hand, if 
incentive-compatibility subject to budget balance and individual rationality is to be enforced, inefficient solutions 
are deliberately being accepted – and such inefficiency can be enormous as truthful and budget balanced mechanism 
implementations give proof of (cp. e.g. McAfee (1992); Barbera and Jackson (1995)). Less inefficient allocations 
can, though, be reached without insisting on truthful information revelation (Parkes et al. 2001). We follow such a 
non-incentive-compatible mechanism design approach by maximizing the reported welfare of the network 
participants. 
The actual design of a budget-balanced payment scheme presented in this article is based on the work of David 
Parkes (Parkes et al. 2001). We extend his approach by adding incentives to strengthen a network's degree of 
interoperability which is a valuable property in the context of SVNs. 
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Let T  denote the sum of all incoming edges to service offers { }
f
V v‚ . Furthermore let 
i
τ  be the number of 









=  denotes the incoming-edge-ratio for 
each node. Recall, 
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e represents an interoperable connection of service i V∈  with service u V∈ , meaning that 
service i  is capable of interpreting service u 's output, i.e. service i  is interoperable with service u . Thus, the more 
incoming edges to a service offer, the higher its feasible interoperability with its predecessor services. Hence, the 
incoming-edge-ratio 
i
r  represents the degree of interoperability of service i  with its predecessor services in 









 denotes the incoming-edge-ratio of service provider s . 
Let ,scritt∆  denote the critical value of service provider s . The idea to construct a transfer function that accounts for 
budget balance constraints is based on the work in Parkes et al. (2001) and focuses on choosing adequate discounts 
s∆  for each service provider s S∈  instead of paying every allocated service provider the critical value. The 
decision on how to choose adequate discounts is formulated as a general optimization problem subject to budget 
balance constraints. 
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 Based on the optimal solution *∆  of the Lagrangian problem, the complete interoperability transfer function 
evolves accordingly: 
                                       
,s s
ij( ) ( )
s
ij,s ( ) ( )
s
ij( ) ( )
, if  e o,C r
, if  e o,C =r
:
, if  e o,C r
0, otherwise
crit
iji j j s
s
ijITF i j j s
























                                            (10) 
IT Services 
12 Thirty First International Conference on Information Systems, St. Louis 2010  
Example 2 (Achieving Budget Balance (Continued)). Recalling Example 1, this continuation illustrates how budget 
balance can be retained by implementing the interoperability transfer function. In order to determine an optimal 
threshold parameter Cτ , each service provider that owns allocated service offers is decreasingly ordered by its 
incoming-edge-ratio sr . The number of possible edges within G  is denoted by T 10= . Consequently, the incoming-












sr = . 




. The optimal threshold equation is satisfied by *
1
10
Cτ =  
with * 2k =  which is the solution that satisfies the conditions 
* *







∆ ≤ ∧ ∆ >∑ ∑S S . The value ∆%  for 
service provider 
1




s −∆ = =% . Payments for allocated service offers evolve accordingly such that 
1, 2 4 6
ITF s
t = + =  and 4, 2 4 6ITF st = + = . As 12 (6 6) 0R = − + =U , the outcome of the extended CSA is budget-
balanced and does not have to be subsidized externally. It is important to notice that the interoperability transfer 
function rewards service provider 
4
s  for the high degree of interoperability – i.e. the incoming-edge-ratio 4sr  – 
which increases the variety of feasible complex service compositions.  
Utility of the ITF Mechanism 
In summary, the ITF utilizes the available surplus, i.e. budget-balanced (Design Goal 2), and assures its distribution 
to contributing service providers in a way that rewards interoperability endeavors (Design Goal 5) – it implements 
incentives to increase ones interoperability to other providers – and at the same time limits strategic behavior 
(Design Goal 4). However, the assurance of budget balance and the payment of rewards for interoperability 
endeavors come at the price of losing truthfulness in a strictly analytical sense. Nevertheless, the ITF is designed to 
limit non-truthful behavior as far as possible considering the surplus constraints which is extensively shown by the 
numerical analysis in the remainder of this work.  
From a platform provider perspective, the ITF mechanism embodies an attractive pricing model as it is sustainable – 
i.e. it does not require external (platform) subsidizations. Secondly, the fact that interoperability is increased within 
the SVN leverages the power of combinatorics within the long-tail of business as it exponentially increases the 
number of sellable complex services (solutions) which in turn attracts new customer groups. Thirdly, the mechanism 
design limits strategic behavior of service providers, that is, it makes non-truthful information revelation less 
favorable to a certain degree (assuming rational behavior). Consequently, the SVN becomes a trust-worthy 
environment for all participants, which is an important aspect in anonymous distributed structures. 
Manipulation Robustness of the Interoperability Transfer 
Recalling that in the basic CSA, allocated service providers are paid their price bid plus their critical value 
compensating their contribution to the whole system. This critical value is designed to implement a dominant 
strategy equilibrium in which every service provider reports its multidimensional type truthfully to the auctioneer. 
Nevertheless, incentive compatibility comes at the price of losing budget balance, i.e. the sum of service providers' 
transfers may exceed the service requester's willingness to pay which results in a negative budget that has to be 
subsidized externally. As a possible remedy to retain budget balance, the ITF extending the basic CSA was 
introduced. The ITF distributes the available surplus in a way that additionally to their bid, allocated providers are 
paid their critical value in the priority of their degree of interoperability subject to budget balance. It is obvious that 
in order to restore budget balance, incentive compatibility has to be sacrificed to a certain degree. Incurring this 
trade-off, the set of possibly beneficial bidding strategies of service providers increases and from a pure analytical 
perspective truthfulness does not hold under the presence of the ITF extension. Although the primary goal from an 
incentive engineering perspective of the ITF is to reward interoperability endeavors, the design of the ITF gives a 
good indication that bid manipulation is only beneficial to a certain level which strongly depends on the level of 
competition (Hurwicz 1972b; Jackson 1992; Roberts and Postlewaite 1976). We analyze strategic behavior of 
service providers in the CSA with the ITF extension following a simulation-based approach. 
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Simulation Model 
To analyze the manipulation robustness, a simulation is conducted as follows: A random SVN topology is created 
with density 1.0  (complete graph) and – depending on the degree of competition – with a predefined number of 
service offers and candidate pools. For simplicity and without loss of generality it is assumed that each service 
provider owns only a single service offer within the SVN. The competition rate results from the number of 
alternative complex service instances (number of feasible paths) without the participation of a single service 
provider. The number of feasible paths depends on the number of service offers within the network as well as on the 
number of candidate pools and the density of the graph, i.e. the ratio between the number of edges and the number 
of all possible edges in the graph. The ratio between the number of service offers and the number of candidate pools 
is also responsible for the number of possible service compositions. 
Each problem set is characterized by a random network topology with random costs 
ij
c  assigned to each incoming 





U K  with K  being the number of candidate pools. 
1
2
K  denotes the mean price of a complex 
service in a network with K  candidate pools and internal costs of service providers drawn from (0,1.0)U  under the 
presence of truthfulness. 
 
 
Figure 4. Simulation Model for the Evaluation of the Manipulation Robustness of the ITF 
 
For each problem set, a single service offer's incoming edge 
ij
e  is randomly selected. The bid price 
ij
p  is 
manipulated stepwise from 50%  to 150%  in steps of 10%  of the true valuation 
ij
c . For each manipulation rate the 
auction is conducted and the service provider's utilities for the deviation and the truth-telling strategies are computed 
based on the ITF and on the critical value transfer function which serves as a benchmark. Figure 4 depicts the 
stepwise procedure of the simulation. As the number of variable parameters and their interdependencies are high, 
heavy statistical noise is likely to be generated. To counteract the high volatility of the simulation model, a large 
number of problem sets of 5000 (identified by a sensitivity analysis) is evaluated for each degree of manipulation 
and the mean results are reported. In order to identify the degree of manipulation for which a deviation from the 
truth-telling strategy is beneficial for service providers, the statistical significance is tested using a one-tailed 
matched-pairs t-test analyzing the alternative hypothesis that service providers benefit from manipulation, that is, the 
mean difference in utility is greater than zero. The large size of the analyzed problem sets for each observation 
assures robustness of the t-test to violations of the normality assumption (Bridge and Sawilowsky 1999; Ramsey 
1980; Sawilowsky and Blair 1992). 
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Results 
For participating service providers in the CSA with the ITF extension, possible strategies and corresponding 
outcomes are illustrated in Figure 5. The decision tree evaluates possible bidding strategies in comparison to a truth-
telling strategy. Focusing on a single service provider, two fundamental cases must be considered in order to 
evaluate the result of different strategies: 
1. Having followed a truth-telling strategy, the service provider s  would have been allocated by o . In this 
case, overstating the true valuation by announcing a price 
ij ij
p c>%  leads to a payoff s sπ π≥%  if the service 
provider stays allocated and to a payoff s sπ π<%  if it is dropped out of the allocation. The monotonicity of 
the allocation function assures that the service provider still gets allocated by understating the true 
valuation such that 
ij ij
p c<%  which leads to a payoff s sπ π≤% . 
2. Having followed a truth-telling strategy, the service provider s  would not have been allocated by o . In 
this case, by overstating the true valuation announcing a price
ij ij
p c>% , the service provider is not allocated 
due to monotonicity of the allocation function which leads to a payoff s sπ π=% . Understating the true 
valuation results in a payoff s sπ π<%  if the service provider gets allocated and to a payoff s sπ π=%  if it is 
not allocated. 
 
Figure 5. Decision Tree of Service Providers Robustness of the ITF 
 
The effect of a bid manipulation strategy of service providers is highly dependent on the level of competition in the 
SVN as this increases the risk of dropping out of the allocation by overstating ones true valuation. As market size 
increases, participants become price takers and strategic considerations converge towards a truth-telling strategy 
(Hurwicz 1972b; Jackson 1992; Roberts and Postlewaite 1976). In the CSA, the level of competition results from the 
number of alternative paths in the absence of a single service provider. Therefore a good indication for the level of 
competition can be derived from the number of feasible paths in the network. The lower the level of competition, the 
higher the benefit for service providers that deviate from their truth-telling strategy. Table 1 shows the utility of a 
single manipulating service provider in a low competition setting with 12 service offers in 4 candidate pools. 
Understating one's true valuation results in a negative utility gain compared to a truth-telling strategy. However, 
service providers that overstate their true valuation significantly benefit from a deviation up to 100% of their true 
valuation. 
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Table 1. Utility for a single manipulating service provider with 12 service offers in 4 candidate pools. abs 
denotes the mean absolute utility and rel the ratio of means of the utility with manipulation and the utility 
following a truth-telling strategy. sd is the standard deviation of the mean absolute utility. * denotes 
significance at the level of 0.1p = , ** at 0.05p = , and *** at 0.01p = . 
 Critical Value Transfer  Interoperability Transfer 
Manipulation Rate abs rel sd abs rel sd 
-50% 0.0423 0.5865 0.0793 -0.0209 -0.6871 0.1022 
-40% 0.0562 0.7789 0.0506 -0.0009 -0.0308 0.0714 
-30% 0.0631 0.8741 0.0334 0.0113 0.3645 0.0478 
-20% 0.0693 0.9603 0.0136 0.0194 0.6763 0.0264 
-10% 0.0715 0.9904 0.0050  0.0250 0.8795 0.0144 
0% 0.0722 1.0000 0.0000 0.0302 1.0000 0.0000 
10% 0.0715 0.9906 0.0050 0.0317 1.0688*** 0.0125 
20% 0.0705 0.9771 0.0097 0.0327 1.0968*** 0.0199 
30% 0.0703 0.9738 0.0102 0.0393 1.1380*** 0.0283 
40% 0.0696 0.9638 0.0137 0.0384 1.1776*** 0.0355 
50% 0.0673 0.9320 0.0261 0.0379 1.1774*** 0.0435 
60% 0.0640 0.8870 0.0383 0.0384 1.1016*** 0.0445 
70% 0.0627 0.8691 0.0424 0.0377 1.0866*** 0.0486 
80% 0.0603 0.8354 0.0508 0.0355 1.0535*** 0.0449 
90% 0.0596 0.8251 0.0521 0.0362 1.0233* 0.0475 
100% 0.0591 0.8181 0.0533 0.0351 1.0581*** 0.0508 
110% 0.0578 0.8006 0.0560 0.0378 1.0091 0.0537 
120% 0.0554 0.7670 0.0632 0.0354 0.9652 0.0524 
130% 0.0550 0.7613 0.0639 0.0314 0.9824 0.0543 
140% 0.0534 0.7395 0.0672 0.0317 0.9529 0.0576 
150% 0.0526 0.7285 0.0685 0.0344 0.9557 0.0581 
 
In the setting with 20 service offers in 4 candidate pools as shown in Table 3, service providers do not significantly 
gain from deviation of more than 20%. Although, the CSA with the ITF extension is not incentive compatible in a 
strict theoretical sense, service providers cannot significantly benefit from deviation from reporting their true 
valuation, i.e. the truth-telling strategy is a best (or equally good) strategy compared to any manipulation strategy. 
Providing an overview over multiple settings with different levels of competition, Figure 6 illustrates the relative 
utility gain following a manipulation strategy compared to truth-telling. 
Implications 
In summary our results lead to the several implications. As the attraction of SVNs is subject to network externalities, 
the value that service requesters gain from initiating a CSA highly depends on the number of participating service 
providers and the number of feasible complex service instances that can be provided through the network. Hence, 
especially in an early growing stage of a SVN, it might be desirable for platform providers to implement a 
mechanism that rewards service providers for offering multiple services with a high degree of interoperability, such 
as the CSA with the ITF extension does. Especially in settings with a low level of competition, critical values of 
service providers can be relatively high and unpredictable for the platform provider. Hence, a budget-balanced 
variant might be favorable in such an early stage as well. Reaching a critical mass of participants the network’s 
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inherent competition increases and critical values of service providers tremendously decrease. Assuring complete 
truthful behavior of service provider, the CSA with the critical value transfer might be beneficial for both service 
providers and the service requester. Service providers do not have to reason about the other participants’ behavior 
and the service requester trustfully receives a tailored complex service instance. This variant always assures a 
welfare maximizing solution accounting for the providers’ and the requester’s side. 
Table 2. Utility for a single manipulating service provider with 20 service offers in 4 candidate pools. abs 
denotes the mean absolute utility and rel the ratio of means of the utility with manipulation and the utility 
following a truth-telling strategy. sd is the standard deviation of the mean absolute utility. * denotes 
significance at the level of 0.1p = , ** at 0.05p = , and *** at 0.01p =  
 Critical Value Transfer  Interoperability Transfer 
Manipulation Rate Abs rel sd abs rel sd 
-50% 0.0025 0.1122 0.0630 0.0111 0.7315 0.0741 
-40% 0.0107 0.4870 0.0425 0.0003 0.0187 0.0495 
-30% 0.0173 0.7854 0.0231 0.0090 0.5533 0.0292 
-20% 0.0208 0.9444 0.0089 0.0137 0.8251 0.0146 
-10% 0.0219 0.9916 0.0020 0.0150 0.9434 0.0063 
0% 0.0220 1.0000 0.0000 0.0167 1.0000 0.0000 
10% 0.0219 0.9920 0.0017 0.0169 1.0298*** 0.0059 
20% 0.0215 0.9748 0.0051 0.0168 1.0227*** 0.0086 
30% 0.0205 0.9300 0.0108 0.0157 0.9929 0.0111 
40% 0.0195 0.8849 0.0156 0.0150 0.9266 0.0143 
50% 0.0191 0.8662 0.0169 0.0149 0.9129 0.0163 
60% 0.0189 0.8562 0.0176 0.0150 0.8881 0.0166 
70% 0.0185 0.8387 0.0197 0.0148 0.8794 0.0187 
80% 0.0183 0.8324 0.0201 0.0153 0.8847 0.0201 
90% 0.0182 0.8246 0.0207 0.0149 0.8776 0.0218 
100% 0.0179 0.8125 0.0217 0.0149 0.8526 0.0220 
110% 0.0176 0.7988 0.0235 0.0148 0.8480 0.0234 
120% 0.0174 0.7888 0.0243 0.0154 0.8303 0.0266 
130% 0.0168 0.7602 0.0270 0.0139 0.7904 0.0270 
140% 0.0165 0.7474 0.0285 0.0139 0.7947 0.0293 
150% 0.0163 0.7397 0.0293 0.0139 0.7869 0.0279 
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Figure 6. Utility for a single manipulating service provider in different competition 
scenarios. ITF\_ | |V% \_ K  denotes the setting with | |V%  service offers in K  candidate pools, 
where | | { , }
s f
V V v v=% ‚  
Conclusion 
In this article, we provided an auction mechanism – the Complex Service Auction (CSA) – to coordination value 
creation in Service Value Networks (SVNs). The CSA implements a truth-telling equilibrium in weakly dominant 
strategies, i.e. service providers cannot benefit from misreporting their true valuation satisfying Design Goal 4. This 
is a valuable property for a mechanism and the implemented social choice as it assures truthful behavior of all 
participants which allows for an efficient allocation that maximizes welfare among service providers and the service 
requester which meets Design Goal 1. Truthfulness comes at the price of budget balance. As a remedy for this 
shortcoming, the Interoperability Transfer Function (ITF) was developed. The ITF sacrifices truthfulness and 
efficiency to a certain degree in order to retain budget balance. The ITF furthermore rewards service providers that 
offer highly interoperable services within the SVN, which increases the number of feasible service compositions that 
can be offered to requesters. Thus, the ITF implements incentives to increase a services’ interoperability and 
therefore fosters the growth of vital and more agile SVNs satisfying Design Goal 5.  
Using the CSA with the critical value transfer as a benchmark, the robustness of the ITF extension was analyzed 
with respect to bid manipulation of service providers (deviation from the truth-telling strategy). The simulation-
based results showed that in scenarios with a low level of competition, implementing the ITF extension opens up 
strategic behavior to a certain degree. Service providers can significantly benefit from misreporting their true 
valuation. Nevertheless, in settings with a slightly higher level of competition, the set of beneficial manipulation 
strategies is decreased tremendously. Although the CSA with the ITF extension does not implement truthfulness in a 
strict analytical sense, service providers cannot significantly benefit from misreporting their true valuation in 
settings with a still relatively low level of competition.  
Service components that are traded in service marketplaces such as the CSA also require low level resource services 
(utility services) to enable their deployment and assure scalability during run-time. Focusing on the infrastructure 
layer, it is also reasonable to trade utility services themselves independent from mechanisms to allocate and price 
complex services in SVNs. Nevertheless, utility services expose different characteristics and therefore impose 
different requirements upon suitable market mechanisms. Combining the trade of utility and complex services, the 
question arises of how a multi-layered market can be designed in order to enable a seamless allocation and pricing 
of complex services and corresponding utility service which are required by the layer above. 
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